document = XMLUtils.toW3cDocument(message.getPayload());
XML Issues in Mule ESB
Released November 21, 2014
On 11/13/14, David Jorm reported two issues related to XML handling in Mule ESB. We analyzed both issues and provide a response below.
The two issues were reported as follows:
This issue is less about Mule ESB specifically, and more about how the referenced component is used. Mule ESB provides building blocks that can be used to write applications. The blocks that use xstream convert an XML document to any arbitrary object. The vulnerability exploits the fact than if an untrusted XML is converted, that XML could be crafted so that a special type of class gets deserialized (for example, a proxy that proxies a process execution class with values to execute any process).
XStream version 1.4.7 blocklists deserializing an EventHandler class which is the case exhibited in the exploit, but it is just a mitigation, as many other frameworks provide similar classes.
The main point is that the problem is primarily in the improper use of the message processor, and upgrading to 1.4.7+ will just mitigate this specific vector. The real solution is that applications built on Mule ESB should not blindly transform any input without sanitizing it first — which is true for any app.